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PREFACE
3
When the Committee began its work on the role 
of induction in embedding ethical standards 
in public life we were aware of a degree of 
scepticism from those in Parliament. The very 
fact of being a politician, and in particular an 
elected politician, it was argued, meant that 
normal workplace solutions to standards issues 
– like induction – should not, or indeed could 
not, apply. The nature of politics complicated the 
whole process of upholding the Seven Principles 
of Public Life.
This viewpoint did not entirely convince us. The 
Seven Principles of Public Life were a response to 
political scandals, and the solutions set out by Lord 
Nolan for maintaining and restoring standards in 
public life – including guidance, education and 
training, particularly induction training on the 
Principles and Codes of Conduct – were developed 
with Parliament, amongst other institutions, 
in mind. Did the nature of politics and its 
institutions make such a difference when it came 
to embedding ethical standards, or was Parliament 
simply resistant to change?
In order to help us better understand ethics in 
practice for politicians we commissioned this 
report from Mark Philp, Chair of our Research 
Advisory Board and Professor of History and 
Politics at the University of Warwick. Mark has 
helpfully gone back to first principles in his 
discussion of the Seven Principles, and explored 
what they mean in the context of the adversarial 
politics of Westminster. His paper shows that, 
although the nature of political ethics in practice 
is complex, the principles advanced by Lord Nolan 
remain central in the challenge to raise ethical 
standards in the twenty first century. Those 
engaged in the political life of the country need to 
recognise that the ethical requirements of politics 
demand serious public deliberation and reflection 
and that finding creative solutions for raising and 
embedding ethical standards in public life will 
depend on that process. 
LORD PAUL BEW
Chair, Committee on Standards in Public Life
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1.1 The idea of providing elected politicians 
with programmes to increase their awareness 
of their ethical responsibilities is seen by many 
representatives and members of the executive 
as impugning their integrity and their common 
sense. It is also seen by many politicians as 
presuming that other (unelected) people are 
in a better position to know what to do than 
are representatives who are elected precisely to 
exercise their judgment on matters of controversy.
1.2 Many ethics or standards programmes for 
politicians may well be subject to such objections. 
This does not mean there is no case for preparing 
those who enter political office for some of 
the ethical issues they will face, although any 
such preparation must avoid encroaching on 
the legitimate sphere of political judgment. 
The justification for such preparation lies in the 
distinctive character of political responsibilities 
and in recognising that there are a number of 
dimensions to political judgment. In particular, the 
distinction between the ethical requirements of 
public office and the legitimate sphere of political 
judgment is not well understood. This brief paper 
attempts to assist wider discussion of political 
ethics and standards in public life by identifying 
some of the relevant distinctions between aspects 
of political roles. It focuses primarily on elected 
office holders.
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2  POLITICAL ETHICS 
AND MORALITY
2.1 Political ethics is not the same as personal 
morality and the two sets of requirements do 
not always align. Political ethics broadly covers 
standards, rules, norms and precepts that relate 
to the roles and functions that political office 
serves and the concomitant responsibilities that 
incumbents of office undertake to fulfil. These 
responsibilities are not identical to acting ‘morally’ 
or with personal integrity. Indeed, there is some 
similarity to other professions in the separation of 
personal morality and professional ethics. A doctor 
with a strict personal moral code deriving from 
religious commitments must distinguish between 
what her formal responsibilities for the care of a 
patient requires and what she would herself opt 
to do in a similar situation as a patient. Similarly, 
politicians may not always be able to do what 
their consciences demand because, in accepting 
the responsibilities of public office, they accept 
duties that it would be inappropriate (unethical 
or ‘dishonourable’) to ignore even when these 
clash with their personal moral convictions. For 
example, they have duties to represent their 
constituents’ interests even where they regard 
aspects of those constituents’ lives as morally 
reprehensible or repugnant. In no case are such 
conflicts easily resolved, but the potential for such 
clashes highlights the fact that role requirements 
differ from those of personal morality.
2.2 The Seven Principles of Public Life set out 
by the Nolan Committee in 1995 and reiterated 
with slightly revised descriptors in the Fourteenth 
Report of the Committee on Standards in Public 
Life Standards Matter (2013) have been the subject 
of some commentary.1 The initial descriptors of 
the Seven Principles did not wholly match ordinary 
people’s understandings of the meaning of the 
Principles, and that disjunction was a matter of 
concern. The revised descriptors are much closer 
to how ordinary people understand the Principles. 
Nonetheless, the distinctive character of the Seven 
Principles is less often acknowledged and ought 
to be emphasised. The Principles are not guides 
to morality. Rather, they set out the standards 
that those in public office must respect in their 
1  First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (HMSO, 
1995); Standards Matter: the Fourteenth Report of the Committee 
on Standards in Public Life (Cm 8519, 2013); Mark Philp, ‘The seven 
principles of public life: What they say and what they mean’, Report 
to the CSPL, 2002 (revised 2012).
capacity as holders of public office. They should 
demonstrate honesty; they should make decisions 
with objectivity and be open about the way in 
which they have reached those decisions; they 
should set aside their own interests (selflessness) 
when acting in their official capacity; they should 
show leadership to others and be prepared to 
be held accountable for their conduct through 
the appropriate mechanisms; and they should 
demonstrate integrity, that is, they should act in 
ways that are compatible with their acceptance 
of public office and with its concomitant 
responsibilities.
2.3  Although some of the Principles are 
sometimes interpreted as identifying personal 
qualities, such as honesty and integrity, the way 
in which they are stated addresses the qualities 
of the person as an occupant of public office, 
fulfilling a certain role.2 The Principles lay out in 
broad terms the ethical demands made on those 
who hold and exercise public office. Whether 
and to what degree these are compatible with 
individual moral convictions is a distinct question, 
as is the extent to which they line up with 
common sense. Preparing people for or supporting 
them in meeting their ethical responsibilities is not 
a matter of teaching morality or common sense. 
The Seven Principles address the distinct domain 
of duties associated with public office.
2.4 The potential confusion of the Principles with 
precepts of morality is understandable. Many 
members of the public think of principles such as 
honesty and integrity as referring to personality 
traits or deep-seated features of personal 
character. Nonetheless, this confuses the person 
with the office holder, and fails to distinguish 
between a judgment about what sort of person he 
or she is, and a judgment about what sort of office 
holder he or she is. In some areas many members 
of the public clearly do recognise the distinction. 
They can see that in many political contexts it 
would be inappropriate to require politicians to 
2  See Susan Mendus, Politics and Morality (Polity Press, 2009)  
chs 1 and 2.
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be completely honest and candid.3 For example, 
they can see that it would not be right to press 
ministers for details of talks or meetings if 
revealing those details might jeopardise further 
progress. In many cases the public must reserve 
judgment, respect confidentialities, and create 
space for deliberation and reflection outside the 
glare of publicity.
2.5 Ethical standards with respect to public office 
and public service apply (at the very least) to those 
who hold senior positions in the public service and 
to those in any form of elected political office. The 
exact demands of the Principles will vary according 
to the office or role and its specific responsibilities, 
but they need to be understood as providing 
a distinctively ‘political’ ethic. In this respect, 
political ethics is similar to the ethical codes 
that govern conduct in law, medicine and other 
professions. In each case, the formal character 
and responsibilities of the role, the importance 
of sustaining public trust in the execution of 
those roles, and the fact that the decisions made 
have major implications for the rights, liberties 
and welfare of citizens, gives ethical significance 
to ensuring that a common set of standards 
is adhered to in the execution of the duties 
associated with these roles. 
2.6 In some respects, however, political ethics 
faces distinct challenges. There is no formally 
established body overseeing the professional 
ethics of politicians in the way that there is in 
law and medicine. There is also a good deal of 
contention as to exactly what the appropriate 
standards of political conduct are both in 
general and in particular cases. And there 
are often very basic disagreements between 
those holding the same or similar roles – such 
as political representatives – as to what their 
central responsibilities are and how they are 
best fulfilled. It is one thing to recognise that 
there is a distinctive set of ethical principles 
for political office; it is another matter entirely 
to achieve widespread consensus on exactly 
what those principles demand in any given 
instance. Insisting on the relevance and validity 
of the Seven Principles does not mean that they 
necessarily give determinate guidance in every 
particular case, not least because individual 
principles may conflict with each other or be 
indeterminate between rival courses of action. 
This makes political ethics distinctly challenging. 
That it is so, is a reason for thinking that some 
preparation for and ongoing reflection on the 
demands of public office might be appropriate.
3  This is one conclusion drawn from the qualitative work undertaken 
by the Committee into how ordinary people understood the 
principles of public life conducted for the Thirteenth Report, and 
that undertaken earlier for the CSPL by the National Centre for 
Social Research, Guiding principles: Public attitudes towards conduct 
in public life (October 2002) and by BMRB,  Review of the descriptors 
of the Seven Principles of Public Life (November, 2006).
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3  POLITICAL ETHICS AND 
POLITICAL JUDGMENT
3.1 Political ethics concerns the principles that 
guide and constrain the interpretation and 
understanding of the role and function of 
public office. The Seven Principles should guide 
politicians’ judgments and their consequent 
actions. They are only one component of 
judgment: they will not tell politicians what 
policies they ought to adopt, although they 
touch aspects of such judgments. For example, a 
decision to adopt a policy requires an appreciation 
of the relevant facts: the ethical requirements 
of the Principle of Objectivity should influence 
judgment about what the relevant facts are, the 
degree of confidence they command, and what 
further evidence is required before a decision is 
made. These judgments are to be made in the 
light of an appreciation of the role, function 
and responsibilities of office; they should not be 
determined by mere expediency or strength of 
political conviction.
3.2 The relationship between political ethics 
and modern politics more widely has several 
dimensions that are not always easy to reconcile. 
For example, politics is partly about winning 
– nominations, candidacies, elections, offices, 
debates, votes.4 But winning cannot be achieved 
at any price: not least participants should respect 
the rules and procedures of the process. Moreover, 
while many political systems are vulnerable to 
winners altering the rules to make it more likely 
that they will keep winning, the legitimacy of 
the political system depends on a high degree of 
consensus on the character of the political game 
and the rules for contesting political office.
3.3 Politics is competitive, but a distinctive 
feature of consolidated political systems is that 
the competitive political process generates 
governments who see their responsibilities as 
owed to the polity as a whole, rather than merely 
to those who voted for them. Only in such systems 
do legislation and negotiated political solutions 
command wide authority and legitimacy, enabling 
public office to stand above and apart from the 
particular interests of groups and individuals. 
Only where it does so can politics play its crucial 
role in the authoritative resolution of conflicts 
4  Bernard Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005)p. 13
and the management of consensus. Playing that 
role, however, presumes the acceptance of certain 
ethical constraints on political conduct.
3.4 A third dimension of political office is that 
those who exercise this power and authority are 
accountable to those over whom it is exercised.5 
As John Locke put it, people are not disposed 
‘to avoid what mischiefs can be done them by 
polecats and foxes, (only to be) content, nay think 
it safety to be devoured by lions.’6 Political office is 
won by competition, it claims a general authority 
over the polity, but the people who exercise such 
office are accountable – both in terms of whether 
they have fulfilled the formal responsibilities of 
their office, and in terms of whether their public 
approves of the policies that they have used their 
office to enact. These last two judgments involve 
a distinction between formal accountability (did 
they act ‘properly’?) and political accountability 
(do we approve of what they did?). Political 
systems that blur the distinction risk subordinating 
ethical considerations to expediency, or 
eliminating the distinct political dimensions 
of judgment.
3.5 It is not difficult to see that these three 
dimensions of politics – competition, authority 
and accountability – can be in tension. 
Each, unconstrained by the others, creates 
problems. Ethical principles serve in part to 
guide the individual’s navigation of these 
competing demands.
3.6 These principles are brought to bear 
within particular contexts that make distinctive 
demands. For Members of the UK Parliament to 
recognise their responsibilities they require some 
understanding of the nature of representation, 
of the different interpretations of that role and 
the functions it serves, and a grasp on how that 
role currently plays out in the UK political system. 
That should inform the way they respond to and 
help frame the expectations of their constituents, 
their local party, and their Westminster party and 
colleagues. MPs who serve only one section of 
their constituencies fail in their responsibilities 
as the representatives of that community. 
5 Mark Philp, Political Conduct (Harvard University Press, 2007) Ch. 3.
6 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch.VIII, sect.93. 
Political Ethics and Political Judgment
MPs who refuse to support the causes of members 
of their constituencies in cases of grievance 
against the state, are similarly not meeting their 
role responsibilities. And MPs who are merely 
delegates of their constituents similarly fail since 
the responsibility (as least in the UK, in part as 
a result of the influence of party in individual 
electoral success) is to serve both the constituency 
and the wider political platform on which they 
were elected.
3.7 Similarly, recognising that there may be cross-
pressures and conflicting demands from a range of 
constituencies – voters, local party, central party, 
Westminster colleagues, etc., – does not tell us 
how office holders should resolve these pressures. 
Nor will identifying the ethical principles 
relevant to the public roles and functions of MPs 
automatically determine how such conflicts should 
be resolved. Ethical considerations provide a 
frame for the judgment and they help to clarify 
some components of the judgment to be taken. 
For example, they may prompt reflection for 
decision-makers as to whether they can both 
make a particular decision and accept being 
held to account (politically) for the decision and 
(formally) for the way the options were evaluated 
and alternatives eliminated. For any political 
decision, we can ask whether the politician can 
give an account of the decision that meets the 
criteria of honesty and demonstrates objectivity; 
was the decision taken uninfluenced by personal 
interests or considerations; how far was the 
judgment made compatible with the leadership 
that the office provides within the political system; 
and does the compatibility of the judgment 
with these requirements reflect the integrity 
with which the agent accepts and seeks to fulfil 
the responsibilities of the office. None of these 
questions focuses directly on the content of the 
decision or policy. Instead, each is concerned with 
how far the decision-making process meets the 
ethical standards associated with the office that 
is held.
3.8 Public offices serve their functions and 
perform as they should only if those in office 
acknowledge the weight of these considerations 
in the exercise of their judgment. Without 
these standards, political rule has an entirely 
different character. These standards are intrinsic 
to consolidated democratic politics because 
while government rests on opinion, it is opinion 
concerning the legitimacy of its authority. People 
acknowledge and accept political authority in 
part because they see it as working within these 
principles.7 These standards are instrumental to 
politics because government on these principles 
works more effectively since it is in a position to 
elicit the willing compliance of those subject to 
its authority.
3.9 Those in office, then, need judgment in 
responding to the conflicting demands under 
which they are placed; they need a sense of 
responsibility that is embedded in their office and 
the ends it serves; and they need to recognise 
that they are accountable to their colleagues, 
peers and to the general public for the way 
they interpret those responsibilities and for the 
judgments they make. Certain decisions may 
concern matters of law and its interpretation, but 
the scope of political judgment and responsibility 
means that a great many decisions are properly 
‘political’: making them one way rather than 
another is a matter of judgment – one that must 
be informed by ethical standards although these 
will rarely in themselves determine a decision.
3.10 The distinction between the ethical 
components of a decision and matters of political 
or policy judgment is important even if it is not 
easily drawn. Consider a decision by the executive 
of a local authority to provide care for the elderly 
in their own homes using a variety of service 
providers on grounds of economy, despite this 
resulting in very poorly co-ordinated care and, 
for recipients, a bewildering array of constantly 
changing people entering their homes. Is this an 
ethical matter or a political one? One question to 
ask is whether those commissioning the care are 
taking their different responsibilities sufficiently 
seriously: they clearly have responsibilities under 
various Acts to provide access to various forms of 
care, and have responsibilities to ensure a cost-
efficient service. They also have responsibilities 
to provide a service that meets certain standards 
of care, and certain ways of fulfilling the first 
two responsibilities can be incompatible with 
meeting this last. There are political decisions that 
those in office have the responsibility to make 
and for which they are politically accountable 
to the electorate and public opinion: about how 
much to spend on this sector, and about what 
standards of care should be provided, and with 
what distribution of cost between the recipient, 
their families, and the community at large. But 
providing care that is substandard because it 
is ill-coordinated and confusing and alienating 
for the recipients is a policy outcome that could 
reasonably have been predicted and rejected in 
advance on the grounds that it is incompatible 
with the authority’s responsibilities to those 
who are vulnerable. Allowing that outcome 
7  David Hume, ‘It is therefore, on opinion only that government is 
founded’ in ‘Of the First Principles of Government’ in Essays Moral, 
Political and Literary.
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does not demonstrate the requisite commitment 
to objectivity and openness in managing the 
responsibilities of that office. In this case, 
the judgment of those who commission and 
implement the service can be criticised for the way 
its design fails to meet certain ethical standards 
of judgment.
3.11 Nonetheless, formal accountability systems 
and popular political accountability must 
recognise that ethical guidelines do not avoid 
every possible poor outcome. Political decision-
making is often a judgment call under pressure 
of time and rapidly moving events and conditions 
of risk and uncertainty. We want people making 
those judgments to set aside self-interest, to 
have integrity, to be alert to their responsibilities, 
and to be scrupulous in assessing the factors in a 
case. But we would be naïve to think that probity 
in judgment will necessarily and in every case 
produce optimal outcomes. Ethical principles 
guard against only one set of ways in which 
things can go wrong. The reality of politics is that 
judgment does not always go right, but we have 
no better alternative for reaching authoritative 
decisions in situations of multiple conflicting 
interests, values and views, uncertain evidence, 
and disputed claims.
3.12 The UK’s adversarial political system is 
not good at keeping these various elements 
apart. The failings of one’s political opponents 
are often greeted as failures simultaneously 
of ethics, politics, and competence. The cross-
party, investigative select committee system has 
done something to sustain some distinctions 
between these components, as have Royal 
Commissions, special inquiries and so on. But 
they are not distinctions that come easily to 
ordinary people or to the popular press; and 
their confusion creates bad incentives in politics. 
Ethical failures should not be brushed aside by 
the exercise of a government majority. Difficult 
decisions should be capable of being presented 
in a way that underlines the concern to meet 
the ethical requirements and is open about the 
difficulties of being confident of achieving the 
desired outcomes.
9
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4 HIGH POLITICAL OFFICE
4.1 These different dimensions of judgment, and 
the tendency for them to be confused, means 
that the challenge is to assist those in public office 
in reflecting on the nature of the judgments 
that they must make and the pitfalls that certain 
options face. They need a sense of the ways in 
which judgment can be distorted or misled, either 
by individual hubris or by certain forms of ‘group-
think’. Those in office ought to be exposed to a 
variety of situations or scenarios in which complex 
judgments have to be made and in which, while 
there may not be a single right answer, there will 
be bad answers – that is, judgments that cannot 
be defended consistently in the light of the 
principles of public office.
4.2 There is an added area of complexity in 
relation to high governmental office. As Bernard 
Williams pointed out some time ago: “It is a 
predictable and probable hazard of public life that 
there will be these situations in which something 
morally disagreeable is clearly required. To refuse 
on moral grounds ever to do anything of that 
sort is more than likely to mean that one cannot 
seriously pursue even the moral ends of politics.” 
As Williams notes, however, we do not want 
politicians who simply discount such costs: “we 
need to hold on to the idea, and to find some 
politicians who will hold on to the idea, that there 
are actions which remain morally disagreeable 
even when politically justified…only those who 
are reluctant or disinclined to do the morally 
disagreeable when it is really necessary have much 
chance of not doing it when it is not necessary.”8 
For Williams, what we want from people in 
politics is not just sensitivity to the beliefs of 
others (something that a cunning manipulator 
might have), but also some responsiveness to 
these principles and values in their own right, 
even if they do not wholly determine their actions. 
Being a good politician, on this account, is having 
an ability to recognise and to feel the weight of 
the values, claims and commitments that exist in a 
given situation, without thinking that this weight 
must over-ride every other consideration. We also 
want politicians to be moved by more than what 
serves their personal or political interests, even if 
we also recognise that they may not do what we 
want wholly for the reasons we would want them 
to have. Motives in politics are often mixed and 
identifying the right balance between contending 
claims is far from simple. Indeed, such decisions 
are often further complicated by elements of 
public accountability and the requirements of 
honesty and openness. The difficulty of sorting 
through such decisions so as to clarify their 
multiple dimensions and to accord to each its 
appropriate weight in the final judgment lends 
some support to the view that there may be things 
that can be done to help prepare or support those 
who face such decision making.
4.3 Of course, those who take such decisions 
often have many sources of advice, from senior 
civil servants through to special advisors and 
experts. But providing such advice is also a 
responsibility that should be governed by certain 
standards, and we need confidence that those 
who provide advice do so with the appropriate 
sense of responsibility. The larger questions are 
about who is taking final responsibility for the 
decision, what grounds are appropriate to the 
decision, what the duty of accountability is in 
respect to such decisions, and to what extent the 
individual is content that the decision is one which 
he or she can defend before the relevant authority 
– whether Parliament, the electorate more widely, 
or a special inquiry. In these judgments the aim 
must be to equip people to think about the kind 
of justification they believe that the public or 
other relevant body ought to be prepared to 
accept (because they should be able to see that it 
meets certain ethical and practical standards for 
such a decision).
8  ‘Politics and Moral Character’, in Stuart Hampshire, Public and 
Private Morality (Cambridge University Press, 1978), 62, 64
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5  SUPPORTING POLITICAL 
JUDGMENT
5.1 Political ethics is not widely taught, not 
least because of its difficulty, the resistance 
many politicians have to it, and the fact that 
there is often no right answer. Politicians are 
right to think that, in many cases, they have to 
exercise judgment, where that judgment brings 
together facts, commitments, values and ‘ethical’ 
components in ways that are difficult to separate. 
It is not straightforward to assess what is possible 
or what is desirable from whose point of view, 
or what the probabilities of success of different 
courses of action are. Nor is it easy to ensure that 
this process of judgment exemplifies the principles 
of selflessness, integrity, and objectivity, and can 
be defended openly and honestly in ways that 
are subject to appropriately wide accountability. 
Political ethics is not a matter of telling people 
what the right answer is: its role is to assist 
those in public office in exploring the various 
considerations relevant to political judgment, and 
to help develop more secure, stable and wiser 
judgments in often difficult circumstances.
5.2 In the UK political system it is possible to 
attack an opponent for the judgment they formed 
without attacking them on ethical grounds – but 
that is not as widespread in the world as we might 
wish and the distinction can easily be rendered 
fragile. This is one reason why it is crucial that the 
distinction is acknowledged in media and public 
commentary. As part of the wider political culture 
that they observe and over which they exert 
often considerable influence, those engaged in 
reporting and commenting on politics ought to 
take cognisance of the ethical principles of the 
political order and acknowledge when decisions 
are taken appropriately even if there is partisan 
disagreement over whether it is the right decision. 
In a world where the public are not clear on the 
distinctions, media blurring of the issues will mean 
that those in politics will also have still greater 
difficulty in keeping the components distinct.
5.3 The challenge is to heighten awareness of 
the ethical principles, and to do so across the 
political system – from the local constituency party, 
the parliamentary party and the chief whips, the 
formal bodies such as the Parliamentary Standards 
Committee and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, 
and bodies linked to the senior civil service. This 
requires a degree of cross-party commitment. The 
Seven Principles are non-partisan in character, so 
that while the judgments politicians make are 
usually partisan on some dimensions, the common 
ethical standards that apply to any given decision 
need to be acknowledged. Partisan disagreement 
over the ethics of public office – like partisan 
disagreement over the rules of the political game 
– would seriously damage the political system and 
its standing with the public.
12
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6  LEADERSHIP AND  
JUDGMENT
6.1 Those in elected public office demonstrate 
ethically sound judgment when they take 
decisions and justify them on grounds that they 
believe that the public or other bodies to which 
they are accountable ought to be prepared 
to accept. Making the decisions on one basis 
and justifying them on another is not ethically 
sound. Liberal democracies presume a certain 
transparency and openness for accountability to 
work. Of course, having a large majority might 
enable a government to do what it wants to do, 
but even where there is a plausible mandate for 
certain policies, the exact nature and shape of 
those policies, the basis for advancing them in 
a particular form at a particular time, and the 
preparations made for their implementation 
also raise issues about how far their formulation, 
introduction and execution meet standards of 
openness, honesty, and objectivity; whether they 
meet the selfless or public good requirement; 
the extent to which the decisions are properly 
accountable; and the degree to which the 
standards of decision-making embody the quality 
of leadership, and do so by exemplifying the 
integrity with which those engaged in the process 
weighed and reconciled the responsibilities they 
have as holders of public office, with the electoral 
mandate they received.
6.2 There may also be a further dimension of 
leadership that the political process demands. 
If the political system and its processes are to 
have authority, they must command respect. 
Administrative decisions should demonstrate 
impartiality and objectivity, otherwise people 
lose confidence in the process. Those in political 
office often face more extensive demands.  In 
the UK Parliamentary system few politicians can 
claim a wholly personal popular mandate for 
their actions in politics. Their legitimacy as office 
holders rests on the public’s endorsement of the 
wider political process and on the place the office 
plays in that system. They can compromise both 
these by behaving in ways that are incompatible 
with the leadership and integrity that the public’s 
confidence in that process presumes. When 
aspects of politicians’ private lives are presented as 
evidence of hypocrisy or as a lack of commitment 
to the office, this may often be a matter of private 
morality being inappropriately brought into the 
public sphere. On the other side, politicians have a 
responsibility not to appear as if they are treating 
the law with contempt, or bringing the political 
process into disrepute, or acting in ways that are 
irreconcilable with their public commitments, or 
exploiting opportunities to benefit themselves. 
This is not a comprehensive list. What should help 
to generate such a list is the question of what 
would count as the occupant of an office giving 
adequate weight to the public significance of 
that office and to the expectations of leadership, 
probity and selflessness that are associated with 
high public office.
6.3 Of course, political life can give rise to 
conflicting demands and expectations. The 
public do not want politicians who line their own 
pockets. They expect them to give priority to 
the public interest rather than being concerned 
with their own. They clearly do not want MPs to 
focus wholly on their expenses. But a politician 
who is inattentive to the expenses claimed – for 
example by leaving it to an assistant who claims 
inappropriately – generates problems of a similar 
magnitude. Yet it is unreasonable to expect MPs 
not to claim expenses. For most MPs it is not clear 
exactly what the public see as the correct attitude 
to claiming expenses, and that is because it is 
probably not wholly clear to the public. It is likely 
that only in a system in which what the MP claims 
is largely a function of what s/he is instructed to 
claim by his/her local constituency party, her/his 
parliamentary party, and the formal system for 
claiming expenses, will the process be seen as one 
which is largely out of MPs hands, and therefore 
as something that cannot be represented as 
self-serving. And the responsibility of those 
institutions must be to produce a workable system 
that can command elite agreement and wider 
political legitimacy.
6.4 This is not an exhaustive account of public 
ethics and political judgment. It is offered as a 
contribution to the debate on what might be 
done to ensure that our political system is more 
resiliently defended against some of the ethical 
failings that have dogged it over the last thirty 
years – failings that the Committee on Standards 
in Public Life was set up to address and in response 
to which it first articulated the Seven Principles of 
Public Life.
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